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PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Original Petition From a Decision by the
Commission of Fair Employment and Housing
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Third District
STATEMENT

OF

THE

CASE

Preliminary Statement
In April,

1987, Kenneth C. Phillips, Real Party in Interest,

filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (Department).

(C.T. 6.)

In January, 1988, Gail Randall,

Real Party in Interest, also filed a complaint with the
Department,

id.

Both complaints alleged that Evelyn Smith

(Respondent) discriminated against them on the basis of their
marital status when she did not rent them housing.

(C.T. 7.)

Based on the complaints, the Department issued an accusation
charging Smith with unlawful discrimination.

(C.T. 7.)

The Fair Employment cuid Housing Commission (Commission)
concluded that Respondent had unlawfully discriminated against

1

Phillips and Randall, but it did not rule on Respondent's claim of
freedom of religion.

(C.T. 11-12.)

The Commission ordered

Respondent to cease and desist discriminating, sign and post
copies of notices announcing her unlawful actions, and pay damages
to Phillips and Randall.

(C.T. 14-15.)

Respondent petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of
mandate to set aside the Commission's decision.

(C.T, 22-23.)

Both parties stipulated to dismiss the Superior Court action and
proceed by original petition to the Court of Appeal.

(C.T. 28.)

Respondent petitioned the Court of Appeal, Third District,
for the same writ of mandate.

(C.T. 22.)

The Court of Appeal

issued an alternative writ in order to address an issue of first
impression.

Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission. 30

Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1013, r^v. granted.
(1994).

__ Cal. 4th __, S040653

That issue was whether the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act (FEHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing
based on marital status, is unconstitutional if it is applied to
someone who discriminates against an unmarried couple by refusing
to rent housing to them based on a religious belief.

Id. at 1014.

The court held that the Commission order penalizing Respondent on
the basis of the FEHA violated her rights under both the United
States Constitution and the California Constitution,
This Court granted review on September 8, 1994.

id. at 1014.

__ Cal, 4th __,

33 Cal. Rptr. 567, S040653.
Statement of Facts
Respondent owns and leases four rental units in Chico, CA.
(C.T. 3.)

She rents the property for commercial purposes and

reports the income as business income.

(C.T. 3.)

Respondent

advertises the apartment in the local newspapers to fill any
vacancies,

(C.T. 3.)

When prospective tenants inquire about a

2

vacancy. Respondent tells them she only rents to married couples
due to religious reasons.

(C.T. 3-4.)

Respondent believes that

sex outside of marriage is a sin and that God will judge her if
she rents the apartment to unmarried couples.

(C.T. 4.)

In response to Respondent's advertisement, Phillips and
Randall drove by the vacant apartment and took special interest in
the unit due to its convenient location, particular neighborhood,
architecture style, cuid well-maintained premises.

(C.T. 4.)

When

they called the next morning. Respondent told them that she was
not willing to rent to an unmarried couple and asked them how long
they had been married.

(C.T. 4.)

In order to get the apartment,

Phillips falsely represented to Respondent that he and Randall
were married.

(C.T. 4.)

On April 7, Respondent rented the apartment to Phillips and
Randall.

(C.T. 5.)

Later that day, Phillips told Respondent that

they were not, in fact, married.

(C.T. 5.)

Respondent replied

that she could not rent the apartment to an unmarried couple
because it would violate her religious convictions.

(C.T. 5.)

She returned the rental deposit, and the couple never moved into
the vacant apartment.

(C.T. 5.)

Hurt and angered by Respondent's rejection, Phillips and
Randall began to look for a suitable place to live.

(C.T. 5.)

As

a result of their continuing search, they took time out of work
and purchased a listing of apartments from a rental agency.
5.)

(C.T.

Seven months later, they found an apartment that was less

conveniently located and more expensive than the unit that
Respondent had declined to rent to them.

3

(C.T. 5.)

Questions

Presented

Does the Fair Employment and Housing Act prohibit a landlord
from discriminating against a couple based on their unmarried
status?
Does the ^ith incidental effect test, which was established
by the United States Supreme Court for cases involving a
burden on the right to free exercise of religion, apply to a
California case based on a free exercise claim?
Does a neutral, generally applicable law apply to a
landlord who discriminates against unmarried, cohabitating
couples based on a religious belief that fornication is a
sin?

4
V

j
r

4

SUMMARY

or

ARGUMBNT

The United States Supreme Court has held that individuals
must comply with a neutral, generally applicable law that
incidentally affects the free exercise of religion.

Respondent

urges this Court to disregard the Supreme Court's decisions and
allow her to unlawfully discriminate through an exemption from the
Fair Employment and Housing Act and the California Unruh Act.
Such a decision would have serious repercussions.

Not only

would it allow Icuidlords to unlawfully discriminate and therelcy
deny individuals the fundamental necessity of housing, it would
undermine the state of California's goal of providing a decent
home and living environment to its citizens.

Furthermore,

allowing an exemption from this law would permit every landlord
and business establishment to defy existing laws and establish
their own.
Respondent has failed to demonstrate that the burden on her
free exercise of religion outweighs the state's interest in
eradicating housing discrimination.

Close consideration of the

minimal, if any, burden on Respondent, and the overwhelming
importance of preventing landlords from denying individuals
housing based on arbitrary standards, compels reversal of the
Court of Appeal decision allowing Respondent an exemption from
anti-discrimination laws.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IS A DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE
LEGAL ISSUES.
The facts in this case are not in dispute.

Since only issues

of law are in question, the correct standard of review for this
Court is independent, or de novo review of the legal issues.
People V. Louis. 42 Cal. 3d 969, 985 (1986).

5

II.

THE CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT PROTECTS
UNMARRIED COUPLES FROM DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING BASED
ON THEIR MARITAL STATUS.
A prerequisite to any discussion regarding the constitutional

issues presented in this case is an analysis of the reasons why
Phillips and Randall fall within the marital status protection
enumerated in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.

The

California Legislature adopted the FEHA with the intent of making
it unlawful to arbitrarily discriminate in housing and employment.
Cal. Gov't Code § 12920 (West Supp. 1995),

Government Code

section 12955(b) makes it unlawful for the owner of any housing
accommodation to make an inquiry concerning the marital status of
any person seeking to rent housing.
Supp. 1995).

Cal. Gov't Code § 12955

(West

Due to the legislative intent, relevant case law,

and considerations of public policy, Phillips and Randall are
protected based on their marital status.
A.

Interpretation of the Term “Marital Status"_in
the Fair Employment and Housing Act to Include
Unmarried Cnuoles is Not only Reasonable, but
Compelled.
1-

The fundamental rule for interpreting a
statute, which is to discern and effectuate
the intent of the legislature, reveals that
marital status includes unmarried couples.

When interpreting a statute, the fundamental rule for a court
is to determine the intent of the legislature so that it can
effectuate the purpose of the law.
5 (1982).

People v. Black. 32 Cal. 3d 1,

The court must first look to the plain meaning of the

statute's language.

Id.

The plain meaning of marital status can

reasonably be interpreted to include unmarried couples.

A

reasonable definition of marital status includes persons who are
unmarried and cohabitating, married, single, divorced, widowed, or
separated.

E.g.,

Swanner y. Anchorage Equal Rights _Commission.

6

874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska 1994), cert, denied. __ U.S. __, 115 S.
Ct. 460 (1994).

In addition to the reasonable interpretation of

marital status, extrinsic sources also demonstrate that the
legislature intended to include unmarried couples under the
protection of the FEHA, including, but not limited to, the
statutory scheme of the statute, relevant case law, and public
policy goals of the legislation,
2.

id.

The legislature's decision to not amend section
129.5
even after Hec;s and Atkisson interpreted
it to include .unmarried couples^compels adoption
of the Hess and Atkisson interpretations.

The legislature's intent to adopt a definition of marital
status that includes unmarried couples can be inferred by its
choice not to aunend the FEHA after two California Court of Appeal
cases defined the term to include unmarried couples.

Atkisson v.

Kern County Housing Authority. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89 (1976)

(holding

that a policy forbidding unmarried couples from living together
constituted discrimination based on marital status); Hess v. Fair
F.mnlovment and Housing Commission. 138 Cal. App. 3d 232

(1982)

(adopting a broad definition of marital status which includes
unmarried couples).

The Atkisson and Hess opinions are important

for they placed the legislature on notice that the courts are
interpreting marital status to include unmarried cohabitating
couples.

See Estate of McDill. 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837-838 (1975).

This Court stated that it is assumed that the legislature knows of
the current law and the interpretation the courts have given it.
Id. at 837.

When the legislature writes a statute or modifies the

existing law, they are assumed to take the interpretation of the
appellate courts into account.

Id.

Failure to change a law in

light of the current interpretation is indicative that there is an
intent and approval to leave the law as it stands,

7

id. at 878.

Thus, in the present case, the legislature is assumed to know and
approve the definition of marital status as interpreted by the
California Courts of Appeal in the Hess and Atikisson decisions.
The California Legislature has had ample opportunity to adopt
a narrower interpretation of marital status by amending section
12955, but has declined to do so.

The latest changes in section

12955 occurred in 1992 and 1993.
(historical notes).

Cal. Gov't Code § 12955

Since the decision in Atkisson nineteen years

ago, the legislature has chosen to leave the interpretation of
marital status as stated in Atkisson and Hess.
B.

California Case Law Has Established That Marital
Status Does include Unmarried Counlpg.

California case law supports Phillips' and Randall's
contention that the term marital status includes unmarried
cohabitating couples.

(C.T. 8.)

In Hess, the California Court of

Appeal held that landlords cannot use one qualifying criteria for
unmarried cohabitating couples and another qualifying criteria for
married couples without violating the protections of the FEHA.
H6SS/ 138 Cal. App. 3d at 232.

The court adopted a definition of

marital status which includes unmarried cohabitating couples.
at 23 6.

The court reasoned that the FEHA was designed to stop the

sort of discriminatory practice that the landlord practiced,
at 235.

Td.

Furthermore,

id.

the court found that no legitimate business

practice existed that would allow landlords to discriminate
against a couple because they were not married,

id. at 236.

The court in Hess based its decision on Atkisson.
Cal. App. 3d at 235.

Hess.

138

Atkisson challenged the Housing Authority's

policy of forbidding individuals of the opposite sex from living
together in low income housing units.
at 93.

Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d

The court held that the policy was a violation based on

8

marital status.

at 99.

Moreover, the prohibition against

unmarried couples was contrary to public policy because it would
prevent unmarried parents from establishing an intimate
relationship with their children,

id^

By similar reasoning to that of the Courts of Appeal,
Phillips and Randall should be granted the full protection of the
FEHA based on their marital status.

Landlords should not be

allowed to discriminate against tenants due to random distinctions
between "unmarried couples" versus "married couples".

To reach

the FEHA's goals of eradicating discrimination, landlords cannot
continue to draw arbitrary lines between groups that are protected
in order to escape liability.

Rather, tenants such as Phillips

and Randall should be afforded the full protection of the FEHA,
which includes prevention of unjustified discrimination against
unmarried couples.

Hess. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 235.

The

elimination of this arbitrary distinction will not only make it
more difficult for landlords to discriminate, it will promote the
public policy objective of preventing harmful discrimination.
C.

Public Policy Reasons Protect Against Unlawful
Discrimination in the Housing Market.

Public policy considerations also favor an interpretation of
marital status that encompasses unmarried couples.
legislature stated,

The

"the practice of discrimination because of .

.

. marital status ... in housing accommodations is declared to be
against public policy."

Cal. Gov't Code § 12920.

Failure to

protect unmarried couples in the housing market would be contrary
to the legislature's goal of preventing arbitrary discrimination.
The statutory language in Government Code section 12993(a)
explicitly declares that the provisions regarding housing
discrimination should be 'construed liberally' to accomplish the

9

goals of the FEHA.

Cal. Govt Code 5 12993

(West Supp. 1995).

Furthermore, the legislature asserted that the chapter on housing
discrimination should provide as much protection regarding marital
status discrimination as any other California state law.
Gov't Code § 12993(a).

Cal.

Thus, construing the meaning of marital

status to include unmarried cohabitating couples fits in with the
liberal construction that the legislature intended for the FEHA.
D-

Ibe Leaislaturp tn^ended thar All Clas.sificatioiiS
ETQtecr.ftd Undpr ^he Act Be Fmial: Therpfore. Courts
tlUSt Grant Marital Staf.us as Murh Protection as
the OthpT^ Classifications.

The FEHA provides identical protection between the enumerated
classifications and equally prohibits discrimination among the
listed classes.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12920.

Nowhere in the FEHA

does the legislature declare an intent to provide one protected
classification any more protection than the other classifications.
Cal. Gov’t Code S§ 12920, 12993.

Furthermore, the legislature

explicitly changed the order in which the classes were listed in
section 12955 to de-emphasize the importance of the order.

Compare

Cal. Govt code § 12955(h) with § 12955 (i).

Respondent contends that marital status deserves less
protection than the other enumerated classifications, insinuating
that the government is less concerned with providing protection
for marital status.
reasons.

Her assertion is erroneous for several

First, her contention contradicts the legislative goal

of providing a liberal construction of the FEHA's protections.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12920,

In fact, the legislature has

specifically granted more protection to all the listed classes
than under comparable state emd federal laws.
12966.6

(West Supp. 1995).

Cal. Gov't Code §

Second, the legislature placed all of

the classifications within the FEHA on equal footing.

10

Cal. Govt

Code § 12920.

Respondent's contention implies that the

legislature made a mistake by doing so.

In essence. Respondent is

substituting her views for the plain wording of the statute.
Third, Respondent's reasoning depends on examples from Equal
Protection analysis.
Protection issue.

Yet, this case does not involve an Equal

Finally, differentiating between enumerated

classifications as Respondent proposes eviscerates the legislative
goal of eliminating all arbitrary housing discrimination.
Providing identical protection to each enumerated class is
compelled by the legislative goal.
E.

id.

The Fair Employment and Housing Act Incorporates
Section 51 of the California Unruh Act. Which
Makes it Unlawful for Anv Person to Arbitrarily
Discriminate in a Business Establishment.

The California legislature made it an unlawful practice to
deny any right created by section 51 of the California Unruh Civil
Rights Act.

Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West Supp. 1995).

provides that,

Section 51

"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state

are free and equal, and .

.

accommodations, advantages,

. are entitled to the full and equal
facilities, privileges, or services in

all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."

Although

section 51 does enumerate certain restricted categories of
prohibited discrimination, this Court has held that the Unruh
Civil Rights Act applies to all persons, not only the enumerated
classes.

Marina Point. Ltd, v. Wolfson. 30 Cal. 3d 721, cert.

denied. 459 U.S. 858 (1982).

This interpretation is supported by

the legislative intent of preventing businesses from engaging in
arbitrary discrimination in access to pxiblic accommodations.
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors. 52 Cal. 3d 1142

(1991).

The

California Courts' liberal construction of the Unruh Act to
protect people from unreasoncdDle discrimination also supports this

11

interpretation.

Crowell v. isaarg. 235 Cal. App. 2d 755

(1965).

III. THE LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE AN EXEMPTION FROM A NEUTRAL
AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW WHICH INCIDENTALLY AFFECTS
THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION.
Respondent requests that this Court excuse her from complying
'^ith a generally applicable law that regulates discrimination in
the housing market.

(c.T. 11-12.)

she contends that compliance

'^ith the statute will force her to alter her religious beliefs,
id*

The United States Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that

religious beliefs have never relieved an individual from following
s general law that is not aimed at that person's religious
beliefs.

Employment Div. . p&n’t. of Human Resources v. Smith.

494 u.S. 872, 879, reh'o dpnipr]

495 u.S. 913 (1990).

The Supreme

Court emphasized that laws may not interfere with religious
beliefs and opinions, but they may interfere with practices that
are counter to the general laws.

id.

To allow an exemption for

every religious practice would make *the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect .
•

. permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."

id.

To prevent this result, the Supreme Court developed and
adopted the incidental effect test as the primary test to analyze
the effect of neutral and generally applicable laws on religious
practices.

California, which has consistently followed the United

States Supreme Court's decisions regarding the application and
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, should adopt the Smith
incidental effect test.
A.

The incidental Effect. Test Defined in smith is
the Appropriate Test to Analyze the Burden of a
State Action on an individual's Religious Practice.

The incidental effect test developed in Smith is the
principal test for courts to use in analyzing the burden of a
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state action on an individual's religious practice.

The smith

case involved an Oregon criminal law forbidding the use of
controlled substances.

Smith. 494 U.S. at 874,

An organization

fired two Native Americans who used peyote for sacramental
purposes.

l^L.

The Court held that Oregon's prohibition on drug

use was permissible under the Free Exercise Clause and, therefore,
the state was permitted to control the use of drugs by Native

1<L. at 890.

Americans.

The Supreme Court's decision provided a

clarification of the proper test to resolve the tension between an
individual's religious practice and the government's application
of a neutral and generally applicable law.

Id. at 886.

For such

an analysis, the Supreme Court chose to abandon the compelling
state interest test developed in Sherbert v. Vemer. 374 U.S. 398
(1963).

Id. at 884.

Instead, the Court adopted the incidental

effect test to analyze state infringement on a person's free
exercise rights.

The Court held that the First Amendment is not

offended if the prohibition on a religious practice is not the
object of the statute, but an incidental effect of a neutral and
general law.

Id. at 878.

Thus, the Free Exercise Clause is not violated if the effect
on an individual's religion is due to a neutral and generally
applicable law.

Id.

The first step of the test is to assess the

neutrality of the law by determining whether it discriminates on
its face.
__,

Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave v. City of Hialeah.

113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993).

U.S.

If a law is not neutral and

generally applicable, it cannot be analyzed under the incidental
effect test.

Id.

Instead, it must be analyzed under the

compelling state interest test.

id.

To determine whether a law discriminates against a religion
on its face, the court must determine if the text explicitly
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refers to a religious practice,

id. at 2227.

If it does refer to

a religious practice, it cannot be categorized as a neutral law.
liL.

If the text is not determinative, the court must survey the

circumstances surrounding the statute's passage to uncover any
overt or masked governmental hostility toward a religion.

Id.

in

City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court analyzed three ordinances
passed by the Hialeah city council which prohibited sacrificial
and unnecessary killings of animals.

HL. at 2228-2229.

The

ordinances made exemptions for many types of killings, except
those for religious purposes,

id.

The Court found ample evidence

that the ordinance was not neutral; in fact, the law was designed
to suppress a specific religion's practices,

id. at 2231.

Once a law is found neutral, the court must determine whether
it is generally applicable.

Id. at 2232.

A generally applicable

law equally prohibits or allows an activity by all individuals and
does not specify or imply applicability to a specific religious
group.

Id*

Even in pursuit of a legitimate interest, the

government cannot target religiously motivated conduct without
violating rights established by the First Amendment.

id.

Neutral and generally applicable laws, therefore, do not have
to be justified by a compelling state interest.
113 S. Ct at 2226.

City of

A neutral and generally applicable law does

not violate the Free Exercise Clause because any effect such law
might have on a person's religious practice is incidental to the
main purpose and intent of the law.
B.

smith. 494 U.S. at 879.

Where a Neutral and Generally Applicable Law Burdens
a Religious Practice Plus Another Constitutionally
Erotected Right, the court Must Analyze the Burden
Under the Compelling State Interest Test.

The Supreme Court stated that the only time the First
Amendment right to free exercise bars application of a generally
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applicable and neutral law is when a hybrid situation exists.
fimirh. 494 U.S. at 881.

Such a situation exists when a law has an

effect on an individual's free exercise right in addition to
another constitutionally protected right, such as freedom of
speech or of the press.

Id.

In the present case, a hybrid

situation does not exist since the FEHA had an incidental burden
solely on Respondent's religious practice.

Thus, the incidental

effect test of Smith is the correct test to analyze Respondent's
claim.
If a hybrid situation does exist, however, the Court in Smith
suggested that trial courts should use the compelling state
interest test developed in Sherbert.

Id. at 883.

The Court

reasoned that using the compelling state interest test where a
generally applicable law imposes a burden on fields such as
speech, press or race are constitutional norms.

Id. at 885-886.

In those fields, the test ensures equality of treatment and
unrestricted flow of information.

Id.

By contrast, using the

compelling state interest test where a law burdens only a
religious practice would produce a private right to ignore
generally applicable laws, thus creating a constitutional anomaly.
Id.

Therefore, the Court established the rule that if a neutral

and general law incidentally burdens an individual's religious
practice, without inpacting other constitutional rights, the
appropriate test is the incidental effect analysis.
In support of its holding, the Court reasoned that applying
the compelling state interest test to a non-hybrid situation would
invite anarchy and open the prospect of allowing exemptions from
generally applicable laws for every conceivable constitutional
protection.

Id. at 888-889.

For example, assume the compelling

state interest test were the applicable standard to review a state
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law's effect on a person's religion.

If a court granted a

religious exemption for users of peyote contrary to a generally
applicable law, that court would be forced to grant a religious
exemption to any other users of narcotics who could sincerely
claim that the use of an illegal drug is a component of their
religious beliefs.

id. at 880.

This presumption is based on

the legal premise that a court is not in the position to question
a person's religious beliefs no matter how unusual they may
appear.

The court can only assess whether those religious beliefs

are sincerely held,

smir.h. 494 U.S. at 877, 880.

Since a court

cannot make distinctions between different religions,

it cannot

pick and choose which religious groups should receive an
exemption.

Id.

Thus, if a court grants an exemption to one

group, it must grant an exemption to all other groups in a similar
position.

Id.

The Court in Smith warned that the use of the

compelling state interest test would open the possibility of
religious exemptions in areas such as compulsory military service,
the payment of teoces, and the administration of drug laws.
494 U.S. at 888-889.

Smith,

When another constitutional right is

implicated, however, the compelling state interest test can be
used to analyze the burden the law has on the other right, which
is an appropriate analysis for a court to undertake,
c.

id. at 881.

The compellina State Interest Test is Inaporooriatg
to Analyze the Effect a Neutral and Generally
Applicable Law Has on a Free Exercise Right. Except
in Limited Circumstances.

By formally adopting the incidental effect test, the United
States Supreme Court held that the compelling state interest test
is inappropriate to analyze a situation, like Respondent's, where
the only constitutionally protected right implicated by a law is
the free exercise right.

Smith. 494 U.S. at 881-884.
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The Court

has acknowledged, however, that the compelling state interest test
may still be applicable in hybrid situations and where the law is
not neutral and generally applicable (discussed above).
Hi a 1 pah. 113 S. ct. at 2217.

city of

The court may also apply the test in

unemployment compensation cases.

Smith. 494 U.S. at 881-884.

Respondent's case does not fall under any of the above
categories.

Although unemployment benefits cases seem to fit into

the non-hybrid category, the Court has explained why they are
exceptions to the incidental effect test.

Smith. 494 U.S. at 884.

Application of the Sherbert test was appropriate in the
unemployment compensation field because a mechanism existed for
individualized governmental assessment of the worker's conduct.
liL.

The unemployment compensation statute created a device to

allow for individualized exemptions provided there was a showing
of 'good cause' on the part of the worker.

Id.

The Court pointed

out that a state may not deny a person benefits based on religious
hardship where it has in place a system for individual exemptions
based on other hardships.

Id.

Thus, the state could only deny a

person unemployment benefits because of religious beliefs if there
was a compelling state interest.

Id.

Since the Government

presented no evidence of a compelling state interest, it failed to
satisfy its burden.
D.

Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 407.

If This Court Decides that the Compelling State
Interest Test Is Appropriate in Respondent’s Case.
It Must Apply a Three Part Analysis to Identify
the Burden on Her Religious Practice. Determine
Whether a State Interest Justifies the Burden, and
Discern Whether the Law Is Narrowly Tailored.

Since this Court may decide that the compelling state
interest test is appropriate in this case, am explanation of the
test's procedures is appropriate.

To apply the test, a court must

first determine whether application of the statute imposes a
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substantial burden on the free exercise of a person's religion.
Sherbert/ 374 U.S. at 403.

The complaining party has the burden

of showing that compliance with the statute would impose a
substantial burden on a religious practice,

id.

A sxibstantial

burden may be proved by the fact that the law forces an individual
to choose between following a religious practice and obeying the
law.

at 404.

The Supreme Court found that Sherbert met her

burden because the statute forced individuals to either accept the
unemployment benefits and forgo a religious practice, or forfeit
the unemployment benefits in order to avoid working on the Sabbath
free from work,

at 404.

in addition, the Court stated that

the complaining party may also establish his burden of proof by
showing that legislation has an indirect effect, as opposed to a
direct effect, on a person's free exercise right,

id. at 404 n.5.

Once a substantial burden is established, the court must
analyze whether this burden is justified by some compelling state
interest,

at 406.

The Court in Sherbert stated that the

government could not meet its burden merely by showing a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest.

id.

The

Government in Sherbert argued that a court-created exemption to
the unemployment benefit law would possibly lead to the increased
filing of fraudulent claims,

id.,

at 407.

The Court rejected

this argument because the government did not present any evidence
to support the contention of possible fraud,

id.

The Court found

that the state interest was not compelling enough to justify the
burden on an individual's religious practice in the absence of
evidence of abuse, fraud, or deceit,

id.

Finally, the court must analyze whether an alternative state
action exists that will both satisfy the government's interest,
and impose a lesser burden on religion.
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In sherh^r^

the Court

stated that, even if there is a possibility of fraudulent claims,
the government has the burden to demonstrate that no other form of
regulation exists that would combat these possible abuses without
burdening Free Exercise Rights.

liL. at 407.

This Court Must AppIv the Smith Incidental Effect
TPst Because California Case Law Shows That
ralifornia Courts Follow the United States Supreme
Courtis interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.

E.

The united States Supreme Court has stated that the Free
Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution applies to the
states due to the Fourteenth Amendment.
310 U.S, 296, 303

(1940) .

Cantwell v. Connecticut.

When interpreting the California

Constitution's Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court of
California has consistently followed the interpretation of the
United States Supreme Court.
(1964)

People v. Woodv. 61 Cal. 2d 716

(citing Sherbert. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfield v. Brown.

366 U.S. 599

(I960); Cantwell. 310 U.S. at 296); MgikP Y. iiQly

Spirit Ass'n for The Unification of World Christianity. 46 Cal. 3d
1092

(1988), pert, denied. 490 U.S. 1084 (1989)

(citing Sherbert.

374 U.S. at 398; Cantwell. 310 U.S. at 296; Wisconsin v. Yoder;
406 U.S. 205 (1972)).

A primary rule of constitutional

interpretation is that a state supreme court is the final arbiter
of its own constitution.
District. 53 Cal. 3d 863
Ct. 3026

(1992)

Sands v. Moronao Unified School
(1991), cert, denied. __ U.S. __, 112 S.

(Lucas, C.J., concurring)

(holding that the

religious invocations and benedictions at a public high school
graduation violate the Establishment Clause).

Although the

California'Supreme Court may consider and decide matters that
arise under the California Constitution independently from the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lucas
emphasized that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court

19

are to be given great deference when this Court deals with
questions of state constitutional law.

id.

This Court went even

further, declaring that "cogent reasons must exist before a state
court in construing a provision of the State Constitution will
depart from the construction placed by the Supreme Court of the
United States on a similar provision in the Federal Constitution."
XeL. (quoting Gabriella v. Knickerbocker. 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89
cert, denied. 306 U.S. 621 (1939)

(1938)/

(upholding student's expulsion

for failure to salute flag and say pledge of allegiance due to
religious reasons)).
Although the exact wording of the constitutional provisions
differs slightly, the state and federal protections of free
exercise of religion are substantially similar.
Cal. 2d at 89.

Gahria

The United States Constitution states,
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"Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
I.

.

.

U.S. Const, amend.

Similarly, the California Constitution states,

"Free exercise

and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed."

Cal. Const, art. I, § 4.

The California Supreme

Court has consistently followed the highest Court regarding the
Free Exercise Clause because both Constitutions substantially
protect the same rights,

id.

In the present case, this Court should follow the example of
prior California Supreme Court decisions and give great deference
to United States Supreme Court decisions by following the ruling
of Smith, and adopting the incidental effect test to evaluate
state burdens on religious practice.

Respondent may contend that

the California State and United States Constitutions are distinct,
or that cogent reasons exist whereby this Court may adopt an
analysis different from the incidental effect test.
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This

contention, however, is in direct contrast to the existing
California Supreme Court decisions.

These decisions declare that

since the Free Exercise protections of both Constitutions are
substantially similar, the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court are essential guides to interpretation of the State's Free
Exercise protections.

Sands. 53 Cal. 3d at 903-904.

The United

States Supreme Court has already spoken on the issue before this
Court.

Smith. 494 U.S. at 879.

Its decision is entitled to great

deference and should be followed because cogent reasons do not
exist that would allow a departure from the incidental effect
Id.

test.
F.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
Unconstitutional.

Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
in order to overturn the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Smith and restore the compelling state interest test established
in Sherbert for cases involving the burden of an individual's free
exercise rights.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.

The Court must not apply

the RFRA in this case as it is an unconstitutional congressional
act.

It is unconstitutional for three reasons.

First, it

violates the well-established rule that it is the judiciary's role
to determine what the United States Constitution allows.
v. Madison. 5 U.S.

(1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).

enacted pursuant to an enumerated power.

Marburv

Second, it was not

Third, it violates the

Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
In Marburv. the United States Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a law passed by Congress,

id. at 180.

The Court

held that it is the federal judiciary's role to interpret the
United States Constitution.
has been upheld.

Id. at 178.

Since 1803, that rule

Although the constitutionality of the RFRA has
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not been addressed in many cases, a United States District Court
has declared it unconstitutional.
F. Supp. 355 (1995).

Flnres v. Citv of Boerne. 877

The court based its decision on the fact

that "Congress specifically sought to overturn Supreme Court
precedent as found in fSmith! through passage of the RFRA."
at 357,

id.

The court in Flores seriously questioned another United

States District Court decision which upheld the passage of rfra as
a constitutional act through section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

The Court explained that Congress only mentioned

the First Amendment as its basis of authority for passing the
RFRA.

at 357 n.l.

Thus, Congress acted pursuant to a

limiting provision, rather than pursuant to an enumerated power.

The RFRA dictates the standard of review to be applied in all
cases involving a federal or state infringement upon the free
exercise of religion.

42 U.S.C, § 2000bb.

The First Amendment,

which is the only constitutional provision mentioned in the RFRA,
is a limitation on Congress, not an enximerated power.
amend. I.

U.S. Const,

Although the United States Supreme Court has allowed

Congress to enhance First Amendment rights, it has only done so
when the enhancement was carried out through an enumerated power.

See I e.q..

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367

(1969)

(allowing enhancement of free speech arid press rights through the
Commerce Clause power).

Moreover, the First Amendment does not,

by itself, allow Congress to regulate state laws with regard to
First Amendment rights.

U.S. Const, amend. I.

therefore, have power to enact the RFRA.

Congress did not,

Congress not only used

the First Amendment to exercise a power it does not have, it
violated the limiting nature of the First Amendment as well.
The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental action that
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has the effect of advancing or endorsing religion.
Allegheny v. ACLU. 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989).

County of

The RFRA does just

that because *its principal purpose is to advance religion, or at
least to advance the free exercise thereof, relative to other
conscientious conduct that is not deemed religious.*
Idleman, The Religinns Freedom Restoration Act;

Scott C.

Pushing the

T^imihs of Legislative Power. 73 Tex. L. Rev, 247, 286 (1994).
Also, a governmental action may not lack a secular purpose.
V. Craham. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).

Stone

In Stone, the Court struck down a

Kentuclcy statute which required public schools to post the Ten
Commandments in classrooms since the purpose for posting them was
'plainly religious in nature.*

Id^ at 41-42.

Like the posting

statute in stone, the RFRA does not have a secular purpose; its
goal is simply to increase religious exercise by making
infringement upon such exercise more difficult to justify.
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U. S.C. § 2000bb.
V.

IF RESPONDENT HAS A FREE EXERCISE CLAIM, SHE IS NOT
ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPTION FROM THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND
HOUSING ACT UNDER ANY OF THE POSSIBLE TESTS.
The free exercise of religion, which is guaranteed in the

United States and California Constitutions, means the right to
believe and profess one's religious doctrine.
877.

Smith. 494 U.S. at

As such, the government may not compel people to believe in

a religion or punish people for expressing religious beliefs with
which it disagrees.

Id.

Free exercise may involve actions or abstention from actions.
Although the government may not ban such acts or abstentions
because of the belief they display, it may limit or ban certain
acts or abstentions which conflict with the law.

id. at 877-878.

*It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously
based, are often subject to regulation by the States .
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.

.

.*

Yoder. 406 U.S. at 220.

In determining whether an action can be

regulated by law, courts apply the facts of the case to a
constitutional test.
The tests for determining whether a person has a right to
exemption from a law based on the Free Exercise Clause consist of
the following:

the incidental effect test; the hybrid test; the

compelling state interest test; or a test developed by an
individual state.

Furthermore, in 1993, the United States

Congress passed the RFRA, which compels courts of the United
States and of the individual states to apply the compelling state
interest test.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.

Before evaluating

Respondent's case, however, this Court must address whether she
even has a free exercise claim.
A.

Respondent Does Not Have a Free Exercise Claim
Because Commercial Conduct. Reaardless of Tts
Motivation., Must Comply with a Neutral. GeneralIv
Applicable Law-

Respondent contends that she should be able to discriminate
against unmarried couples in violation of the FEHA because
compliance would burden her religious freedom.

(C.T. 4.)

Although the state and federal constitutions provide complete
protection for religious beliefs, they only provide limited
protection for religiously motivated conduct.
877-878.

Smiths 494 U.S. at

Commercial conduct will be subject*to a neutral,

generally applicable law, regardless of the motivation for that
conduct.

Jimmy Swacaart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of

California. 493 U.S. 378, 390 (1990).
Jimmy Swacaart Ministries involved a religious organization
which sold religious materials in addition to leading evangelistic
crusades.

1<L. at 381.

The United States Supreme Court held that

the organization had to comply with California's Sales and Use Tax
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Law, regardless of the motivation for the sales,

id. at 390.

The

single burden on the religious organization was a decrease in
revenue, not a violation of religious freedom.

Id.

Similarly,

Respondent is engaged in a business and must, like other
businesses, adhere to the laws which govern it.

In Jiimrrv Swaaaart

Ministries. the Court stated that the law required only that the
religious organization remit taxes.

Id.

Likewise, the FEHA

requires only that Respondent not unlawfully discriminate.
Although Respondent argues that the FEHA's burden is more than
financial, she could simply hire a service to rent her units for
her.

This would ensure that the only burden on Respondent is a

financial one.

Also, both the organization in Jimntv Swaaaart

Ministries and Respondent entered into a commercial activity by
choice.

Neither of them operated a business establishment because

a religious belief required it.
Furthermore, the Unruh Act, which has been incorporated into
the FEHA, prohibits discrimination in any business establishment.
Cal. Civ. Code § 51.

Because Respondent rents apartments to the

public and pays teoces on her income, she cannot argue that she
does not run a business establishment.

(C.T. 3.)

Thus, as a

business establishment. Respondent may not unlawfully discriminate
in her business activity.

Respondent argues that the Unruh Act

does not list marital status as a prohibited type of
discrimination.

The Unruh Act's protection, however, is not

limited to the specific categories listed.
3d at 732.

Marina Point. 30 Cal.

The Unruh Act's protection has even been interpreted

to include prohibition of discrimination based on an individual's
hair length,

in re Cox. 3 Cal. 3d 205 (1970).

Because of the

broad protection afforded by the Unruh Act, Respondent may not
discriminate based on marital status.
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If the Court concludes that Respondent's act is religious
conduct, rather than a business activity, it must evaluate whether
she has a right to be exempted from complicuice with the FEHA.

As

established above, the Smith non-hybrid incidental effect test is
the appropriate test for Respondent's case.

Analysis of that test

will show that the Free Exercise Clause, as applied to
Respondent's case, does not provide for an exemption from the
Moreover, even if the Court decides to apply a different

FEHA.

test, the result will be the same.
B.

The Incidental Effect Test Compels Respondent fn
Comply with Anti-discrimination Laws and Not
Unlawfully Discriminate Against Unmarried

The United States Supreme Court has held that, when
burdening the free exercise of religion is not the object of a
neutral and generally applicable law, but merely an incidental
effect, the right to free exercise has not been offended,
494 U.S. at 878.

smith.

This incidental effect test requires the Court

to analyze two issues.

First, the Court must determine whether

the law is valid and generally applicable,

id. at 878.

To be

valid, the law must be neutral on its face and not aimed at
impeding any particular religious conduct.
S. Ct. at 2231.

City of Hialpah.
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A neutral law cannot aim to restrict or obstruct

religious practices.

Id. at 2227.

Like the Oregon law prohibiting use of illegal narcotics
evaluated in Smith, the FEHA is valid.

It is facially neutral

because it does not refer to a religious activity without a
secular meaning; it does not single out a particular religion, and
it does not address an act that is purely religious.

Instead, the

FEHA's aim is to eliminate discrimination in employment and
housing.

Cal. Gov't Code § 12920.

Unlike the Oregon criminal law, the ordinances adopted by the
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city coxancil in

GitY-Ql Hialeah

113 S. Ct. at 2231.

were not valid,

city of Hialeah.

The city council adopted the ordinances

relating to animal sacrifice in response to community concern
about the Church of the Lu)cumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a faith which
practiced the ritual sacrifice of animals.
2228.

Id. at 2223, 2227-

The Court held the laws invalid based on their targeting of

a particular religion.

Id. at 2228.

The laws prohibited

sacrificial animal killings, but provided numerous exemptions.
Yet, they did not provide an exemption for killings carried out
for religious purposes.

Id. at 2228-2229.

Unlike City of

Hialeah. Respondent's case involves a law that does not have the
effect of targeting a particular religion.

Furthermore, it was

not enacted in response to fear that a religion would engage in a
certain religious activity.

Instead, it was enacted to eliminate

discrimination in employment and housing.

Cal. Gov't Code §

12920.
Second, the Court must determine whether the law is generally
applicable, i.e., if it is a law that applies to all people or all
people involved in a certain area of business.
113 S. Ct. at 2232.

City of Hialeah.

In Smith, the Oregon law prohibiting drug use

was generally applicable because it applied to all people.
494 U.S. at 874.

Smith.

Similarly, the FEHA is generally applicable.

It

applies to anyone who rents housing and to any business
establishment.

Cal. Gov't Code § 12955.

A finding that a law is neutral and generally applicable
means that any effect on religious behavior is incidental;
therefore, no compelling state interest is needed to justify
application of the state law.
2226.

City of Hialeah. 113 S. Ct. at

Yet, if the Court decides that there is a hybrid situation,

i.e. that Respondent has a free exercise claim together with
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another constitutional claim, it must apply the Smith hybrid test.
Smith. 494 U.S. at 881-882.
C.

Resnondent^s Case Does Not Present a Hybrid Situation
Her Only Claim Is Free Exercise of Religion.

In Smith, the Court stated that, except for the unemployment
benefits area, the only time it had found that a neutral and
generally applicable law was invalid was when a free exercise
claim coexisted with another constitutional right,
See. P.CT.■ Cantwell. 310 U.S. at 304-307

id. at 881.

(invalidating a system

for licensing religious and charitable solicitations where the
administrator could, in his discretion, deny a license for any
purpose he considered nonreligious); Yoder. 406 U.S. at 205
(invalidating mandatory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish
parents who would not send their children to school).

The

Cantwell case involved both a free exercise claim and a free
speech claim because the licensing law affected not only religious
freedom rights, but freedom of speech rights.
881.

Smith.

494 U.S. at

In Yoder, the issues were free exercise of religion and the

right of parents to direct the education of their children,

id.

In those cases, the Court applied the balancing test which Smith
has required courts to use in hybrid situations.

Xd-. at 885-886.

Respondent's case, however, does not present a hybrid situation.
Respondent, when faced with the allegation that she had
discriminated against Phillips and Randall, explained that her
discrimination was based on a religious belief that fornication is
a sin.

(C.T. 4.)

At the administrative hearing, Respondent's

only claim for an exemption from the FEHA was based on her free
exercise rights.

(C.T. 4.)

No free speech claim could have

existed based on the FEHA's provision prohibiting discrimination
in housing.

Cal. Gov't Code § 12955.
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Even after the Commission

issued an order stating that Respondent had unlawfully
discriminated and requiring her to sign and post notices
acknowledging her unlawful conduct. Respondent did not raise a
free speech claim.

(C.T. 10,14.)

Although a free speech claim

cannot be waived, the fact that Respondent did not raise such a
claim at the hearing, or in her application for a writ of mandate,
shows that she did not believe her free speech rights had been
infringed upon.

{C.T. 19-23.)

Although Respondent now argues

that her free speech rights have been burdened, she still does not
have a free speech claim.
Respondent has not contended that the Act 'represents an
attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of
religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those
beliefs.

.

.

.'

Smith. 494 U.S. at 882.

Instead, she bases her

claim on the order handed down by the Commission.

That order,

however, came after the Commission's determination that Respondent
had violated the FEHA.

(C.T. 10,14.)

The determination of

Respondent's unlawful discriminatory practice stands alone,
without the order.

Furthermore, the order can be severed,

eliminating the parts which might affect Respondent's free speech
rights.

In other words, the Commission's decision that Respondent

unlawfully discriminated, as well as its order that she cease and
desist doing so, can be separated from the part of the order that
requires her to post notices.

This solution would solve any

possible free speech claim which might have arisen out of the
order.

If, however, the Court finds that there is a hybrid

situation, it must apply the Smith hybrid test.
at 885-886.
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Smith. 494 U.S.

D.

A Finding Thar. There Is a Hybrid Situation, or
That the Rfiliaious Freedom Restoration Act is
Constitutional, or That California Mav Apply Its
Own Test. Ramiires the Court to Apply the Compelling
State TntPrPst Ta^t.

The Smith hybrid test, as well as the test mandated in the
RFRA and the California Molko test, requires courts to engage in
the compelling interest balancing test.

Smith. 494 U.S. at 885-

886; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; Molko. 46 Cal. 3d at 1113,

The outcome

of the compelling state interest test, therefore, will determine
the result of each of those tests.
E.

Application of the Compellina statP mt^rpst Tpgt

If the Court decides to apply the compelling state interest
test, it must engage in a balancing analysis.
882-883.

Smith, 494 U.S. at

First, the Court must determine whether the FEHA imposes

a substantial burden on Respondent's free exercise of religion.
Shsrbsrt/ 374 U.S. at 403.

Second, the Court must determine

whether there is a compelling governmental interest which
outweighs the burden on Respondent's free exercise.

Sherbert/

id. at 407.

which established the test, stated that *[n]ot all

burdens on religion are unconstitutional,'

id. at 403.

Finally,

the Court must determine whether an alternative state action
exists which would impose a lesser burden,

id. at 407.

Analysis

of the test will demonstrate that, not only is there no
substantial burden on Respondent's free exercise, but there is an
extremely compelling state interest in eliminating discrimination
in housing with no less restrictive alternatives.
1.

Application of the Fair Employment and Housing
Act does not substantially burden Respondent's
free exercise of religion.

Because the law does not completely protect religiously
motivated actions, when a court applies the compelling state
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interest test, the law must be found to substantially burden an
individual's free exercise before a court will even consider
whether there is a compelling state interest.

Id.

In Sherbert.

where a member of the Seventh Day Adventist religion was denied
unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays,
the United States Supreme Court held that the unemployment
benefits law imposed a substantial burden on her Free Exercise
rights,

id. at 403.

The applicant, who could not find a job that

would not require her to work on Saturdays, was forced to either
receive benefits and not follow her religion, or forgo the
benefits and observe the Sabbath day.

id. at 404.

Although the

law's burden was indirect, its effect was to impede the observance
of the applicant's religion,

id.

In another United States Supreme Court case, the Court
invalidated a compulsory school attendcuice law as applied to
members of the Amish faith.

Yoder. 406 U.S. at 234.

Despite a

Wisconsin law that mandated school attendance until the age of 16,
Amish parents elected not to send their children to school past
the eighth grade.

Id. at 207, 212.

The Amish based this decision

on the belief that after children learn basic reading and writing
skills, they must learn to work in the Amish community which
favors manual work and self-reliance.

Id. at 211.

Applying the

compelling state interest test, the Court held that application of
the law would result in a severe and inescapable burden on the
Amish because it would force them to perform acts which go
completely against their religious beliefs.

Id. at 218.

In contrast to Sherbert and Yoder. application of the FEHA to
Respondent does not cause a substantial burden.

Unlike in

Sherbert. Respondent is not forced to choose between having food
on the table and practicing her religion.
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She has chosen to be in

the business of renting housing.

She also chose to inquire about

the marital status of couples, although her religion does not
require her to make such an inquiry.i

There are alternative ways

for Respondent to earn a living if she does not want to obey the
laws governing the business she has chosen.

Both the FEHA and the

Unruh Act prohibit discrimination, one in housing and employment
and one in business establishments.

Cal. Gov't Code § 12955; Cal.

Civ. Code § 51.
Second, in both Sherbert and Yoder, the individuals claiming
an exemption would actively have had to do something that they
believed it was a sin to do, i.e. work on the Sabbath day or send
children to high school.
U.S. at 218.

Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 404; Yoder. 406

In Respondent's case, the law would not force her to

fornicate, which she believes is a sin.
her to help others fornicate.

Neither would it force

This is not a situation where the

mother of a teenager allows her child to fornicate in her home.
This case involves two adults who do not need "help* in
fornicating.

It would simply prohibit her from discriminating

against unmarried couples in housing and in a business
establishment.

After all, an unmarried, cohabitating couple that

engages in sexual intercourse will do so whether they live in a
home rented from Respondent or not.
Third, in both Sherbet and Yoder, the religiously motivated
conduct only affected those practicing the religion,
applicant in

Sherbert

when the

chose to observe the Sabbath, she did not

impact others by imposing her religious beliefs on them,

1

when the

Respondent claims that she did not inquire about the marital

status of Phillips and Randall. Yet, the record shows that after informing
them that she did not rent to unmarried couples, she asked them how long they
had been married.
(C.T. 4.)
In effect, this question constituted an inquiry
into their marital status.
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parents in Yoder did not send their children to high school, they
did not affect anyone but others who adhered to their religious
faith.

In contrast. Respondent's conduct directly affects others

in an adverse way.

When she chose to discriminate against

Phillips and Randall and other unmarried couples, she deprived
them of a necessity -- housing.
Unlike sherbet eUid Yoder, the United States Supreme Court did
not find a substantial burden in a case involving a religious
organization which sold religious materials.
Ministries.

493 U.S. 378 at 392.

Jimmv Swaaaart

The Court held that application

of California's Sales and Use Tax Law did not substantially burden
the organization's free exercise rights.

Id. at 389.

The Court

stated that the tax applied to all individuals who make retail
sales of tangible personal property.

Id^ at 390.

Because the

religious organization sold personal property, it had to comply
with the tax law, regardless of the motivation for the sales,
at 696.

id.

The Court held that there was no substantial burden on

the religious organization because a decrease in revenue would not
amount to a constitutionally significant burden.

Id^

Similarly,

Respondent is engaged in a business which must, like other
businesses, adhere to the laws which govern it.

Just as the

religious organization did not want to pay taxes for religious
reasons, Respondent does not want to comply with non
discrimination laws for religious reasons.

Yet, she must because

she is in the business of renting, just like the religious
organization was in the business of making retail sales.
Unlike Jimmv Swaaaart Ministries, this Court did not find a
substantial burden in Molko. where it applied the existing federal
law, i.e., the compelling state interest test.
at 1092.

Molko. 46 Cal. 3d

This Court held that subjecting the church to liability
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for fraud would burden, but not substantially burden, the church's
free exercise rights.

Id. at 1117.

The purpose of the licUDility

was to discourage the Church from committing religiously
motivated, fraudulent conduct by exposing it to possible monetary
loss.

Thus, the church would not be ed^le to recruit new

members without being liable for the use of deceptive tactics.
liL.

Yet, the burden was not substantial because it did not

prevent the church members from having a religious community,
holding meetings, worshiping, associating freely, and
proselytizing on the street.

Id.

This court distinguished Ynd^r

based on the fact that subjecting the Unification church to
liability for fraud would not force the church members to commit
acts undeniably at odds with their religious beliefs,

id.

Similarly, applying the FEHA to Respondent would not make her
commit acts against her religious beliefs.

It would simply compel

her to comply with the laws governing the business activity she
has chosen.

She would simply have to cease unlawfully

discriminating against unmarried couples if she wishes to continue
her in the rental business.
If, however, the Court decides that application of the FEHA
does impose a substantial burden on Respondent's free exercise of
religion, it must determine whether there” is a compelling state
interest which outweighs that burden because *(n]ot all burdens on
religion are unconstitutional.252, 257

United States v. t.pp. 455 U.S.

(1982).
2.

The State ■■Of California has a cnmnellina statP
interest in eradicating invidious digcriminatinn
in housing and business establishTnpn^g

Under the compelling state interest test, once a court finds
that a law substantially burdens an individual's free exercise
rights, it must consider whether there is a compelling state
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interest which will justify the infringement.
at 406.

Sherbert. 374 U.S.

In Yoder. the Court held that such a compelling state

interest did not exist because the state's interest in educating
children and preparing them for the future was outweighed by the
Amish parents' free exercise rights and rights to direct their
childrens' education.

Yoder. 206 U.S. at 229.

The Court

acknowledged that the state had an interest in preparing its
citizens to be self-sufficient and participate in the political
process.

at 221.

Yet, because of the Amish faith's unique

community life-style, that state interest was not compelling.
at 222, 229.

Id.

The Amish have a formal vocational education system

which has a long tradition and is very effective.

Id. at 222.

The state's interest was, in effect, fulfilled because the Amish
do not refuse to educate, they have simply devised an equally
effective educational system of their own.

Id. at 223.

In

contrast, California's compelling interest in eliminating
invidious discrimination in housing and business establishments
will not be fulfilled if Respondent is granted an exemption from
the FEHA.

Instead, it will be completely undermined because she

will actually effectuate the opposite result.
Unlike Yoder, the United States Supreme Court found a
compelling state interest in Lee, where a member of the Amish
faith asserted that compelling him to pay social security taxes
would violate his free exercise rights because the Amish faith
forbids payment of social security taxes.
259.

Lee. 455 U.S. at 258-

The burden on the Amish was not unconstitutional because the

government's strong interest in maintaining a vital social
security system outweighed the right to free exercise.

Id.

Similarly, because housing is a fundamental need in life, the
State of California has a strong interest in eradicating
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discrimination in housing and business establishments.
Health St Safety Code S 50003b (West Supp. 1995) .

Cal.

The California

Legislature stated that its basic housing goal is to provide a
•decent* home and 'suitable* living environment for every
California family.

Id.

Respondent argues that allowing her an

exemption will not deny Phillips and Randall housing because they
can find it elsewhere.

That argument, however,

fails to recognize

the total effect of this stance on the state's compelling
interest.
Allowing an exemption for Respondent could open the door to
numerous claims for exemptions based on religious beliefs.
Smith/ 494 U.S. at 880.

See

The Court expressed its fear of this

potential increase in claims in Lee.

Lee. 455 U.S. at 260.

If an

exemption were allowed for Lee, many others would claim exemptions
from taxes for a myriad of reasons.

Id.

The Lee Court pointed

out that the social security system could not afford to
accommodate the many different religions that exist in the United
States,

at 259.

The Court distinguished Yoder. observing

that few people follow a faith that believes it is wrong to send
children to high school.

Id. at 259-260.

In contrast, many

different religious reasons could be found for the belief that
paying taxes violates religious principles,

id. at 260.

Likewise, if an exemption is allowed for Respondent, she and
other landlords will be allowed to legally discriminate against
individuals because of their race, gender, nationality, or other
characteristics.

For instance, a Catholic might discriminate

against a divorcee based on the belief that it is a sin to get
divorced.

A Christian might discriminate against a couple where

one person is a Christian and the other is not since many
Christians believe that such a couple is incompatible.
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A member

of the Nation of Islam might discriminate against an inter-racial
couple based on the belief that races should not inter-marry.

A

fundamentalist Christian might discriminate against members of any
other religion based on the belief that all non-Christians are
sinners who will go to hell.

Hindus, who do not believe in eating

cows, might discriminate against members of any religion which
permits eating beef.

Like the Court's reasoning in Lee, the

myriad of possibilities that would flow from an exemption for
Respondent is numerous and serious ominous foreboding.
California's interest in eradicating invidious discrimination must
be as compelling as the federal government's interest in
collecting taxes.
An exemption from the FEHA would allow Respondent to
immediately break a law, and it is likely that other landlords
would take advantage of such an exemption to act on biases, not
only against unmarried couples, but against other vulnerable
groups in our society, including mixed-race couples, homosexual
couples, and single mothers.
3.

Phillips and Randall have a fundamental right
to freedom of asgoriar,inn and privarv which
supnlemfinf- r.he compelling state interest.

Along with the state's compelling state interest in
eliminating discrimination in housing, Phillips euid Randall have
the constitutional rights of freedom of association and privacy.
First, the Constitution provides the freedom of intimate
association to relationships in small, close groups.
united States Javcees. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).

Roberts v.

An individual

has a right to intimate association where, like in a family, there
are "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal
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aspects of one's life.*

id. at 620.

Respondent's policy of

unlawful discrimination prohibits Phillips and Randall from
exercising their right of association.
Second, the California Constitution provides Phillips and
Randall the right to privacy.

Cal. Const, art. I, § 1.

That

constitutional provision provides a right against private and
government entities.
Cal. 4th 1, 20 (1994).
live.

Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn,.
They have a right to choose with whom they

City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130

(1980).

They also have a protected privacy interest in their

marital status.

Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 98-100.

Respondent

claims that she simply informed Phillips and Randall that she does
not rent to unmarried couples and that they volunteered their
marital status.

Yet, the record states •Respondent told

complainants that she would not rent to unmarried couples, and she
asked complainants how long they had been married.'

(C.T. 4.)

The question Respondent asked cannot be characterized as anything
but an inquiry into the marital status of Phillips and Randall.
Although this Court in Hill stated that a privacy claim might
fail as against a countervailing interest, the claim does not fail
here.

Hill/ 7 Cal. 4th at 40.

The right of privacy combines with

the right to intimate association and California's compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination to overcome the burden on
Respondent's religious freedom.

Furthermore, there is no less

restrictive means by which the state can fulfill its interest.
4.

There is no alternative state action which
would impose a lesser burden on Respondent.

After a finding the the state has a compelling state
interest, the court must make one final inquiry.

The compelling

state interest test rec[uires that the court determine whether the
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state's interest can be achieved by any less restrictive means.
Thomas v. Review Bd.. Ind. Emol. Sec. Div.. 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981).

In Molko. this Court found that subjecting the church to

liability for fraud was the least restrictive means of carrying
out its goal of public safety, peace and order.
at 1118.

Molko. 46 Cal. 3d

Among the alternatives this Court considered were making

brainwashing a crime, authorizing involuntary deprogramming of
individuals, and requiring proselytizer to obtain informed consent
before trying to gain new members.

Id. at 1119.

This Court

concluded that all the approaches would impose a greater burden
than the tort liability.

Id.

The first would involve coercion by

the state and might result in church members going to jail, the
second posed inherently severe burdens, and the last would require
active dissemination of information about a religion's nature.
Like Molko. requiring Respondent to comply with the Act is
the least restrictive means of carrying out the state's interest
in eliminating discrimination in housing.

Criminalizing

discrimination in housing would pose more of a burden on
Respondent than simply requiring her to not discriminate because,
like Molko. it would require the coercive power of the state and
could result in her going to jail.

As stated by the Alaska

Supreme Court, *tt)he most effective tool the state has for
combating discrimination is to prohibit discrimination; these laws
do exactly that.'

Swanner. 874 P.2d at 280.

VI. ALLOWING RESPONDENT AN EXEMPTION FROM THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT
A14D HOUSING ACT WOULD VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS.
Even if the Court applies the compelling interest test and
finds that there is no compelling state interest which outweighs
the burden on Respondent, the creation of an exemption would
violate the Establishment Clause of the United States
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Constitution.

The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental

action that has the effect of advancing or endorsing religion.
County of Allegheny. 492 U.S. at 597.

The state cannot,

therefore, promote a religion by lending its support.

Td.

An

exemption from the FEHA gives support to Respondent's religious
belief and allows her to shift the burden of her belief onto
Phillips and Randall.

Respondent argues that she is not imposing

her beliefs on others, but merely maintaining them herself.

Yet,

the fact that tenants must fit within her belief structure, or be
denied housing, demonstrates that she is imposing her beliefs on
others.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must hold:
the term "marital status' includes unmarried couples;

(1) that
(2) that the

proper test for determining whether the right to free exercise
provides for an exemption from a neutral and generally applicable
law is that established in Smith: and (3) that regardless of the
test used. Respondent may not be exempt from complying with the
FEHA and the Unruh Act.

Dated:

November 15, 1995

Respectfully submitted.

Counsel for Petitioner
Fair Employment and
Housing Commission
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